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Article 9

Case Comment
RE MACDONALD - CoNFLICr OF LAWS - SUCCESSION - LEGITImACY
LEGITIMATION STATUS In the case of Re Macdonahd the

Ontario Court of Appeal 2 had an opportunity to consider the important
and difficult question of the succession of a foreign domicillary as a
beneficiary under an Ontario will. The facts as proved at trial before
Landreville J. are clear and were not in dispute. John Duff Macdonald,
the testator, died domiciled in Ontario. His will provided in part for life
tenancies and the distribution of any remainder following such life
tenancies to the persons entitled. The will then continued, "and the
issue then living of any grandchild, such issue taking the share their
parent would have taken if then alive."
The last surviving life tenant, John Duff Macdonald Wardrope,
died intestate, and the estate of the testator was to be distributed
amongst the persons entitled thereto. The assets of the estate consisted of personalty situated in Ontario. It is well settled law that
the law governing succession in the case of personalty is the law
of the last domicil of the testator, which in this case was Ontario.
John Duff Macdonald Wardrope, the testator's grandson, died
domiciled in the State of Michoacan in the Republic of Mexico. He
left two daughters surviving him both of whom were over twenty-one
years of age and domiciled in Mexico. One of his daughters was
born in lawful wedlock while the appellant, Maria Sanchez Wardrope,
was conceived and born out of lawful wedlock in the State of
Michoacan where the court found her to be domiciled.
Following her father's death, the appellant brought an action
in the Mexican Courts against his estate for a declaration of paternity.
She received judgment in her favour and it was established by
expert evidence that the effect of such a judgment, while it did not
confer the status of legitimacy upon her according to her personal
law, nevertheless, gave her all the rights of inheritance enjoyed by
a legitimate child domiciled in the State of Michoacan in competition
with a legitimate child as understood by Mexican law. Furthermore,
it was established that she could use her father's name and had the
right to support from him as well as the obligation to support him
while he was alive.
By the lex successionis, Ontario law, it has been established
that the word "issue" used in a will means "legitimate issue". The
question before the Court of Appeal, therefore was, whether or not
Maria Sanchez was the legitimate issue of John Duff Macdonald
Wardrope? At trial, Landreville J., held that Maria Sanchez to be
1 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 14; [1962J O.R. 762.

2 Consisting of Porter C.J.O., Mciennan and MacKay J.J.A.
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illegitimate as she was not born or conceived in lawful wedlock and
therefore was not entitled to succeed as a beneficiary under the
will. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding and held
that the appellant was the legitimate issue of John Duff Macdonald
Wardrope and consequently entitled to succeed.
The Court considered the question whether or not the appellant
was legitimate to be a question of status to be determined by the
lex domicilii of the beneficiary which was the State of Michoacan.
According to that law she was illegitimate, but Mr. Justice MacKay,
who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court, did not feel
himself bound by the use of the words legitimate or illegitimate.
He held accordingly, that since the appellant had the same rights of
inheritance as had a legitimate child in competition with another
legitimate child, she should therefore succeed to a share of the estate
of the testator. The judgment provided in part as follows:
It was ably argued by counsel for the respondent that nevertheless
Maria Sanchez is, by the law of Mexico, an illegitimate child of John
Wardrope. On this point we must return again to what is meant by
the word "status". Is it the name which the foreign law attaches or
do we look behind to determine what incidents, capacities, and obligations the foreign law imposes? In other words, is status the name
which the foreign jurisdiction employs to describe the child in question
or do we look behind to examine the rights and obligations imposed
by the foreign law to determine whether those rights and obligations
are so closely akin to those imposed in this jurisdiction in the case of a
child born in lawful wedlock? And, as I have said, on the facts of this
case I have reached the conclusion that the sum total of the capacities
and obligations vested in the child in question by3 the lex domicilii are
the same as those of a child born in lawful wedlock.
The curious result therefore, it is submitted, is that the appellant
succeeded as a beneficiary under an Ontario estate although she
was illegitimate both by her lex domicilii and by the lex successionis.
As authority for the result, the learned judge relied on extracts
from Cheshire's Private International Law, fifth edition, where the
distinguished author suggests that in cases of legitimacy with a
foreign element, the question ought to be whether the person is
legitimate by his personal law and not whether he is legitimate
according to the law of succession. (i.e. Was he born or conceived
in lawful wedlock?) Cheshire suggests that the lex successionis
ought to decide what class of persons are included by the use of the
word "issue" in the will. The second question, whether or not the
particular person falls within this class is a question of status to
be determined by the individual's personal law. If a person is
legitimate according to his personal law then he should be entitled
to succeed under an English will. The question the author argues
is one of status. He says, "It is determined by the law obtaining
i.e. by the law of his father's
in the child's domicile of origin,
'4
domicile at the time of his birth."
3 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 21.
4 Cheshire, PrivateInternationaZLaw, 5th ed., p. 393.
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According to Cheshire birth in lawful wedlock is the proper
test of legitimacy only for children who have an English domicil.
As authority for his proposed rule in legitimacy cases, the author
cites obiter dicta from legitimation cases 5 and the much disputed
legitimacy case of In re Bischoffsheim.6 None of these cases is, it
is submitted, a convincing or even relevant authority for the proposition that legitimacy is a question of status. The first cases
deal with the issue of legitimation.

In re Bischoffsheim7 might

perhaps best be dealt with by a simple statement that it is wrong
and ought not to be followed.8 This, however, is not satisfactory
and therefore I will discuss this case more fully later in this paper.
Furthermore, there is no authority for saying that the domicil
of origin of a child in all circumstances is the domicil of his father
at the time of the child's birth. The domicil of a child depends on
whether or not the child is legitimate 9 The author acknowledges
this, it is submitted, on pages 395-396 of his fifth edition. 10 This fact,
however, had no effect in this case as both the parents were apparently domiciled in the State of Michoacan.
There is a fundamental difference between those succession
cases involving questions of legitimacy and those dealing with
legitimation. English law has long recognized that children could
succeed under a testacy or intestacy governed by Englisl law as
"child", "issue", or "children" even though they were not born
in lawful wedlock because they were legitimated according to their
personal law. It is submitted that the rule is different and should
not be confused with legitimacy cases such as Re Macdonald.1
Questions of legitimation have been held to depend upon considerations that are not applicable to questions of legitimacy. The Court
of appeal held in Re Grove'2 that the domicil must be in a jurisdiction,
both at the time of the marriage and at the time of the birth, that
allows legitimation by subsequent marriage. This has been changed
by statute in England insofar as it applies to subsequent marriages,
but it is still law where the child claims to have been legitimated
in any other manner. 13 Meanwhile, the classic House of Lords case
of Shaw v. Gould,1 4 in which the issue was legitimacy and not legiti-

mation, held legitimacy to be a question of construction in construing
5 Birtwhistle v. Vardill (1835) 2 Cl. & F 571, 573-4; In re Don's Estate
(1857) Drew 194, 197-8; In re Goodman's Trusts (1881) 17 Ch. D. 266, 291;
In re Andros (1883) 24 Ch. D., 637.
6 [1948] Ch. 79.
7 Ibid.

s Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws, c. 39, p. 754.
9 Udny v. Udny [1869] L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 457.
o Supra, footnote 4.
1l Supra, footnote 1.
12 [1887] 40 Ch. D. 216.

13 Re Luck [19401 Ch. 864.

34 [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 55.
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a will to be determined by the lex successionis. Lord Chelmsford
said:
Whatever may be the views of Scotch Courts as to the legitimacy of
the appellants your lordships are called upon to determine whether they
answer a particular description upon principles of English law, and by
the rules of construction of an English will. It is clear that the words
"son", "lawfully begotten" and "children" can apply only to legitimate
children.15
That is to say that the 7ex successionis lays down what "issue" includes and goes on to determine by its own rules (including its con-

flicts rules) whether or not the person in question falls within the
class so described (i.e. was he born in lawful wedlock). The law of
succession could, it is submitted, declare by its own rules that
"issue" means legitimate issue which in turn might include children
who have been adopted or legitimated as well as those born in lawful
wedlock. Where the question is neither one of legitimation nor
adoption (as in Re Macdonald),16 it is submitted that the Court
should follow Shaw v. Gou d'-7 and determine the validity of the
marriage of the child's parents by the law of succession.' 8
In the present case,19 the issue was clearly one of legitimacy.
On the questions of legitimation and legitimacy Cheshire has this
to say:
That there should be one test for legitimation, another for legitimacy
argues some confusion of thought and is a proposition that on principle
has nothing whatsoever to commend it.20
Another learned author takes a different view of the matter
than Cheshire:
It is not easy to find any strong reasons in legal principle for this
somewhat arbitrary distinction, but there seems to be little prospect
now that even the House of Lords will be able to put the cases of
legitimation on a common and national basis with the cases of legitimacy.
A very peculiar and artificial doctrine has emerged from the legitimation cases; and the most one can hope for is that dicta from the legitimation cases will not be permitted to confuse the clear and intelligible
rule for legitimacy
which was laid down by the House of Lords in
21
Slaw v. Gould.

That comment was made before the decision in the case of In re
Bischoffsheim22 referred to earlier. Until that case, the legitimacy
of a child in an English succession depended on the validity of the
marriage of the child's parents.2 3
15 Supra, footnote 14 at p. 57.
16 Supra, footnote 1.
17 Supra, footnote 14.

Is This follows Shaw v. Goud and Kindersley V.C. in Re Wilson's Trusts,
[1865J L.R 1 Eg. 247, 263-4.
19 Supra, footnote 1.
20 Supra, footnote 4 at p. 402.

21 R. S. Welsh, 63 L.Q.R. 65, at pp. 91-2.
22
2

Supra, footnote 6.
3Brook v. Brook 1861 9 H.L. 193, Mette v. Mette (1859) 1 S.W. & T.

416. In re Paine (1940) ch. 46.
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It is submitted that the learned judge may have erred in In
re Bischoffsheim when he employed, in a case involving legitimacy,
Cotton L. J.'s statements from a legitimation case that:
If a child is legitimate by the law of the county where at the time of
its birth its parents were domiciled, the law of England, except In the
case of succession to real estate in England,24recognizes and acts on the
status thus declared by the law of the domicil.

Romer J. remarked in In re Bischoffsheim that there was no real
distinction between legitimacy and legitimation.
The distinction between legitimacy and legitimation remains
important for purposes of succession despite the dictum of a learned
judge. 25 Dicey formulated clause 2 of rule 120 to conform with the
result in In re Bischoffsheim where a child was held to be legitimate
for the purposes of succession under an English will even though
he was not born in lawful wedlock, because he was legitimate by
the law of the domicil of each of his parents at the time of his birth.
The facts of the case were important. Both parents were domiciled
in the same place at the time of the child's birth. The case did
not refer to the case of In re Paine2 6 where a beneficiary was held
unable to succeed under an English will because the marriage of his
parents, was invalid by English law.
Re Paine points up the fundamental distinction between status
and capacity. The general rule in English law is that a person's
status is determined by his personal law, the law of his domicil.
But, a person's capacity to succeed under a will or intestacy is governed
by the Zex successionis. The bald fact is that an individual may be
legitimate or legitimated according to one law and yet may not be
entitled to succeed according to the law of another country. If this
seems harsh, it is quite possible that the matter could be reversed.
The person attempting to succeed under a will as "issue" might be
illegitimate according to his or her personal law and as such not
entitled to succeed, while at the same time being so entitled by the
law of succession (eg. putative marriage).
It is submitted that the Court in Re Macdonald27 goes further
than Romer J. went in In re Bischoffsheim.2s But both cases failed
to deal with In re Paine.29 The Court in Re Macdonald also failed
to consider the case of Shaw v. Gould 3° which clearly laid down the
test for succession in an estate governed by English law (i.e. birth
in a lawful marriage, the validity of which is tested by English
law). It is submitted that Romer J. makes an inappropriate application of legitimation principles and finds the child legitimate because
24

In re Goodman's Trusts (1881) 17 Ch. D. 266, 299.
v. M. (1946) p. 31, 34, Denning J.
Supra, footnote 23.

25 M.
26

27 Supra, footnote 1.
28

29

30

Supra, footnote 6.

Supra, footnote 23.
Supra, footnote 14.
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legitimacy is governed by the child's domicil of origin. Such a
conclusion is inaccurate both with reference to legitimacy and
legitimation. 31 The child was legitimate by its domicil of origin in
In re Bischoffssheim.3 2 In the present case the child succeeds despite
the fact that she was illegitimate by her domicil of origin and the
Zex successionis.
The reason why the Court in Re Macdonald appears to go
further than the Court in In re Bischoffsheim is because the Court
in the former case considered status to be a bundle of rights, obligations and privileges vested in certain persons, while the Court in the
latter case considered a status to be a "tag-name".
Indeed, Romer J. was not concerned at all with whether or not
the child could have succeeded by New York law. He merely wanted
to know what name New York law attached to a person in the same
position as this child. He concluded that New York law would "tag"
him "legitimate" and therefore he was "legitimate" no matter what
incidents attached to that status.
It is submitted that there are two principal questions involved
in cases of succession under an English will, involving a foreign
domiciliary in which a word such as "issue" is used. First; is the
question to be answered entirely by the lex successionis, or is the
iex successionis to determine only what general class of persons the
testator intended should benefit, allowing the Zex domicilii, of the
intended beneficiary to determine whether or not he belongs to that
class? Secondly; if the personal law is to determine whether or not
the person in question belongs to the class designated by the lex
successionis (i.e. what status does he have by his personal law?),
what in fact does "status" mean? Is it a bundle of rights and
obligations possessed by certain persons who may therefore be called
"legitimate", for example, or is it a "tag name," so to speak, hung
on him by his personal law?
The House of Lords have treated the issue of legitimacy entirely
as a question to be decided by the lex successionis.33 It is submitted
that the House of Lords considers a person's status to be a "tag
name" ascribed to him by the lex successionis in questions of succession under an English will.34
If Re Bischoffsheim and Re Macdonald are correct, (neither
has been overruled), which has the correct view of "status"? Is it
a tag name or a bundle of rights? The testator when he made his
will is deemed to have intended a certain class of persons to benefit
when he used the word "issue". These persons the Court of Appeal
31 Supra, footnote 12, 13.
32
Supra, footnote 6.
33
Shaw v. Gould, Supra, footnote 14.
34

Supra, footnote 14.
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in Re MacdonaNZ5 seems to say, are all those that possess the rights,
obligations and privileges of a legitimate child according to the law
of the child's domicil. This comparison ignores the fact that in
all cases the domicils of the child's parents are not the same as
they were in the present case and in In re Bischoffsheim. 3 6 A child's
domicil of origin depends on whether or not it is legitimate. 37
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeal may have erred
in failing to appreciate the consequences of such a rule. When will
the relationships be the same so that it can be said that the testator
intended the person to share in his estate? How many of the incidents of such a relationship must be the same for the Court to be
able to say that the appellant has the same "status" as a legitimate
person? Furthermore, the persons comprehended by the use of the
words "legitimate issue" by the law of child's domicil of origin may
be entirely different from those included by the lex succesionis.
The comparison of the rights and obligations of the appellant
would have been less objectionable if these rights and obligations
had been compared to those of a child domiciled in Ontario who
was born in lawful wedlock or who otherwise, by Ontario law, fell
within the class of persons designated by the words "legitimate issue".
This would have been more in accord with the testator's intention.
However, it would not escape the difficulty of deciding whether or not
they had the same status.
To avoid the problems presented by In re BischoffsheimW should
the parents have separate domicils, and the difficulties involved in
deciding when two personal relationships are the same or even of
deciding what the incidents, rights, and obligations of a particular
relationship are; it is submitted that in cases of succession involving
a question of legitimacy the law of succession should apply throughout.39 This rule may appear insular but it is certain and best accords
with the intention of the testator or the deemed intention of the
intestate, and the authorities.
DONALD C. MATHESONO

3 ,Supra, footnote 1.
36
37

,Supra,footnote 6.
S uprat, footnote 9.
3
S Supra, footnote 6.
39 BUpra, footnote 4.

*Mr. Matheson is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School,

